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	Provedor de dados AgEcon (6) Autor Babcock, Bruce A. (2) Saak, Alexander E. (2) Secchi, Silvia (2) Kathuria, Vinish (1) Peterson, Jeffrey M. (1) Segarra, Eduardo (1) Sterner, Thomas (1) Wang, Chenggang (1) Mais... Palavra-chave Common property resource (6) Groundwater (3) Resource /Energy Economics and Policy (3) Biotechnology (2) European Corn Borer (2) Externalities (2) Intertemporal optimization (2) Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies (2) Asymmetry (1) Crop Production/Industries (1) Crop rotation (1) Industrial estate (1) Industry association (1) Information (1) Insecticide resistance (1) Integrated pest management (1) K42 (1) Linear response and plateau technology (1) Majorization (1) Nonpoint sources of pollution (1) Mais... Tipo do documento Conference Paper or Presentation (5) Working or Discussion Paper (1) Ano 2009 (1) 2008 (1) 2007 (1) 2002 (1) 1999 (2) País United States (6) Idioma Inglês (6)		Ordenar por:  Relevância Autor Título Ano Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última A MODEL OF PESTICIDE RESISTANCE AS A COMMON PROPERTY AND EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE AgEcon Secchi, Silvia; Babcock, Bruce A.. A dynamic farm production model analyzes the interaction between the externalities caused by pest mobility and the development of pesticide resistance, a nonrenewable resource, in the context of agricultural biotechnologies. The model measures the effect of farmers' myopic behavior and the impact of pest mobility on the path of resistance. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Biotechnology; Common property resource; European Corn Borer; Externalities; Pesticide resistance; Intertemporal optimization; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21664 Groundwater Pumping by Heterogeneous Users AgEcon Saak, Alexander E.; Peterson, Jeffrey M.. Farm size is a significant determinant of both groundwater irrigated farm acreage and groundwater irrigation application rates per acre. This paper analyzes the patterns of groundwater exploitation when resource users in the area overlying a common aquifer are heterogeneous. In the presence of user heterogeneity, the common resource problem consists of inefficient dynamic and spatial allocation of groundwater because it impacts income distribution not only across periods but also across farmers. Under competitive allocation, smaller farmers pump groundwater faster if farmers have a constant marginal periodic utility of income. However, it is possible that larger farmers pump faster if the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk-aversion is sufficiently... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Common property resource; Groundwater; Majorization; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 2007 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9798 Groundwater Use in Asymmetric Aquifer under Incomplete Information AgEcon Saak, Alexander E.. This paper analyzes a game theoretic model of groundwater extraction in an asymmetric two-cell aquifer under incomplete information about the extent to which the local stock of groundwater depends on the extraction histories at nearby wells. A novel assumption is that the elevation of the bottom of the aquifer differs across, otherwise identical, cells. Asymmetry creates a strategic advantage (disadvantage) for the user in the deep (shallow) cell in “stealing” neighbor’s water. The user with a larger initial stock actually benefits from the commonality of groundwater provided that the asymmetry is not too small or too great. Assuming that the asymmetry between users is sufficiently large, better informed, non-cooperative users attain a higher joint... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Common property resource; Asymmetry; Groundwater; Information; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 2008 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/6545 MANAGING PEST RESISTANCE: THE POTENTIAL OF CROP ROTATIONS AND SHREDDING AgEcon Babcock, Bruce A.; Secchi, Silvia. The current debate over resistance management plans mandated by the Environmental Protection Agency for transgenic crops ignores management practices that are complementary to refuge schemes. A dynamic production model is developed that measures the costs and benefits of crop rotation and shredding in terms of delaying resistance to Bt corn. Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Biotechnology; Common property resource; Crop rotation; European Corn Borer; Externalities; Insecticide resistance; Integrated pest management; Intertemporal optimization; Crop Production/Industries; Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies. Ano: 1999 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/21597 Monitoring and Enforcement: Is Two-Tier Regulation Robust? AgEcon Kathuria, Vinish; Sterner, Thomas. The regulation of industrial pollution is clearly difficult in a rapidly industrializing, low-income setting. In addition to the general lack of resources for monitoring and enforcement, authorities must deal with the asymmetric nature of the information and multiple nonpoint sources of pollution. In this study we look at efforts to regulate chemical plants in Ankleshwar, in the Indian state of Gujarat. The plants are located in an industrial estate, which provides interesting preconditions for a form of two-tier regulation, in which an industry association becomes an intermediary between the government and individual firms: it monitors its members' pollution and promotes compliance with the government's environmental regulations. The Indian agency... Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Industrial estate; Two-tier monitoring; Common property resource; Industry association; Nonpoint sources of pollution; Political Economy; Q25; P28; K42. Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10669 Optimal Groundwater Extraction under the Linear Response and Plateau Technology AgEcon Wang, Chenggang; Segarra, Eduardo. This paper studies the optimal management of groundwater resources when agronomic and hydrologic constraints bind the use of groundwater for irrigation. The binding constraints lead to a perfectly inelastic demand for groundwater. In the case of symmetric agents the social and private rates of groundwater extraction coincide with one another and commonality is completely innocuous; in the case of asymmetric agents the rate of extraction remains the same in the social and private setting, yet irrigation is abandoned by the same agent at different times. The model offers one way to rationalize the empirically found peculiarities of sticky water demand and Gisser-Sanchez Effect which defy conventional theory. The situations described in the model also... Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation Palavras-chave: Common property resource; Groundwater; Linear response and plateau technology; The law of the minimum.; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy. Ano: 2009 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51432 Registros recuperados: 6 Primeira ... 1 ... Última

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